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Abstract
Between February 2012 and March 2015, the claim that sex selection abortion was
taking place in Britain and that action needed to be taken to stop it dominated debate in
Britain about abortion. Situating an analysis in sociological and social psychological
approaches to the construction of social problems, particularly those considering ‘‘fem-
inised’’ re-framings of anti-abortion arguments, this paper presents an account of this
debate. Based on analysis of media coverage, Parliamentary debate and official docu-
ments, we focus on claims about grounds (evidence) made to sustain the case that sex
selection abortion is a British social problem and highlight how abortion was proble-
matised in new ways. Perhaps most notable, we argue, was the level of largely unchal-
lenged vilification of abortion doctors and providers, on the grounds that they are both
law violators and participants in acts of discrimination and violence against women,
especially those of Asian heritage. We draw attention to the role of claims made by
feminists in the media and in Parliament about ‘‘gendercide’’ as part of this process and
argue that those supportive of access to abortion need to critically assess both this
aspect of the events and also consider arguments about the problems of ‘‘medical
power’’ in the light of what took place.
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Introduction
This House must make the matter clear. If we cannot get a consistent line from
abortion providers on whether or not it is illegal to abort a girl – it is usually girls
but not always so – for the sole reason that she is a girl, then the law is not ﬁt for
purpose. To do so constitutes a gross form of sex discrimination. Indeed it is the ﬁrst
and most fundamental form of violence against women and girls. (Fiona Bruce MP,
House of Commons debate on the Serious Crime Bill [Hansard, 2015])
On 23 February 2015 the UK Parliament debated and voted on an amendment to
the Serious Crime Bill (an extensive set of proposed changes to criminal law) that
sought to include these words in a new Serious Crime Act: ‘‘Nothing in section 1 of
the Abortion Act 1967 is to be interpreted as allowing a pregnancy to be terminated
on the grounds of the sex of the unborn child’’. The extract above is taken from the
speech made by the Member of Parliament (MP) Fiona Bruce, arguing for other
MPs to support this amendment. She contended that legal change is needed
because it is necessary to clarify to abortion providers that, always, ‘‘it is illegal
to abort a girl’’ and that it should be so because sex selection abortion ‘‘is the ﬁrst
and most fundamental form of violence against women and girls’’. This attempt to
change the law followed a three-year period, beginning in February 2012, during
which claims along the same lines were repeatedly made in the media, and also in
the UK Parliament.
Prior to this attempt to change British law, laws banning sex selection abortion
had already been passed in several states in the USA. Bruce’s proposal was simi-
larly for sex selection abortion to be speciﬁcally prohibited, but the amendment she
proposed was defeated following over two hours of debate (with 201 MPs voting
for it, and 292 against). An alternative amendment was passed by 491 votes in
favour, two against, committing the UK Government to assess evidence of ‘‘ter-
mination of pregnancy on the grounds of the sex of the foetus’’, and where con-
sidered necessary, act to change ‘‘prejudices, customs, traditions’’ which ‘‘amount
to pressure to seek a termination on the grounds of the sex of the foetus’’ (Serious
Crime Act, 2015). This meant that sex selection abortion was institutionalised as a
social problem in Britain, but in the end in a way that left the 1967 Abortion Act
formally unaﬀected.
Drawing on constructionist theories of social problems developed in sociology
and social psychology, this paper highlights how abortion was problematized in
new ways through this debate, as it came to be associated with perceived problems
of religion and ethnicity (described in the Serious Crime Act, 2015 as ‘‘prejudices,
customs and traditions’’) and presented as a form of violence against women.
Perhaps most notable, we argue, was the level of largely unchallenged viliﬁcation
of abortion doctors, on the grounds that they are law violators and participants in
acts of discrimination against women. Although other terms were used by partici-
pants in the debates, throughout this paper we use ‘‘sex selection abortion’’ to refer
to the social problem it was alleged needed to be addressed.
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We suggest that two main areas of interest emerge. The ﬁrst concerns claims-
makers. This is the term used by scholars who explore processes by which condi-
tions that may exist in society come to be deﬁned as social problems; claimsmakers
are people who ‘‘seek to convince others that something is wrong, and that some-
thing should be done about it’’ (Best, 2008, p. 15). In line with eﬀorts to ‘‘feminise’’
opposition to abortion discussed further below, sex selection abortion was initially
made a topic of debate by journalists working for The Telegraph newspaper, a
publication well known for its ‘‘pro-life’’ position, but less predictable claims-
makers also became involved. Overt threats about prosecuting doctors were
made by senior Government ministers, and equally notable was the role of some
who describe themselves as feminists. For most of the period of debate, some
feminists who commented publicly made claims that advocated strongly in
favour of the need to do something about sex selection abortion, an approach
which was only called into question in the ﬁnal phase of debate in 2015.
Secondly, we suggest these events raise related questions about the ‘‘medicalisa-
tion’’ of abortion in Britain. Sheldon (1997) details how doctors’ authority, or
‘‘medical power’’, has been central to the operation of abortion law and practice
in Britain. Claims about sex selection abortion, however, called this authority into
question on the basis that its exercise harms women. We return to the question of
medical authority in the conclusion to this article, but note here that the form
through which ‘‘medical power’’ was questioned is one that those concerned to
defend access to abortion may be disturbed by. Before detailing how these issues
emerge from our research, we ﬁrst discuss insights from studies that contextualise
this episode.
The ‘‘feminisation’’ of the abortion problem
Research based in a variety of disciplines has shown how arguments against abor-
tion are continually modiﬁed. Considerable eﬀorts have been made, for example, to
secularise the anti-abortion argument by borrowing the authority of science to
construct the foetus as an ‘‘unborn child’’, rather than refer to religious authority
(Savell, 2008). Abortion opponents have focussed increasingly on ‘‘late term’’ abor-
tion, including medical techniques used in these procedures, to provoke disgust and
disquiet (Greasley, 2014). Some research in sociology and social psychology con-
siders the work of social movements in gaining support for their cause through a
consideration of claimsmaking activity and the modiﬁcation of social problem
framing (Gavey & Gow, 2001). Best (2008) explains, for example, that a claim is
an eﬀort to persuade others to support and identify with the proposition that
something must be done about a putative social problem, and claimsmaking
responds to changing contexts and experience. In relation to abortion, research
of this social constructionist sort has shown that ‘‘feminised’’ or ‘‘pro woman’’
claims about harms to women emerge as a consistent and prominent feature of the
re-framing of abortion as a problem over the past 25 years.
‘‘Feminised’’ claims against abortion focused on harms to women’s health have
attracted the most scholarly attention (Kelly, 2014; Rose, 2011; Saurette &
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Gordon, 2013; Siegal, 2007; Trumpy, 2014). Cannold has outlined, for example,
‘‘the rise and use of a ‘woman-centred’ anti-choice strategy to oppose abortion in
Australia and the USA’’, based on claims that, ‘‘women do not really choose
abortion but are pressured into it by others and then experience a range of negative
eﬀects afterwards, including an increased risk of breast cancer, infertility and post-
abortion grief’’ (Cannold, 2002, p. 171). Rose provides a detailed analysis of what
she terms ‘‘frame extension in the American anti-abortion movement’’, focussing
on claims about women’s health (2011). One point made about these ‘‘feminised’’
claims is that they respond to diﬃculties this movement has faced in persuading
others, or enough others, to support its cause. ‘‘Faced with what they believe to be
the limited political and cultural eﬀectiveness of movement rhetoric primarily
focussing on fetal life’’, those who call themselves ‘‘Pro-Woman Pro-Life’’ seek
‘‘to reﬁne the terms of the American abortion debate by recasting it as dispute
regarding which position best represents the rights, health and interests of woman –
pro-life or pro-choice’’, suggests Trumpy (2014, p. 164).
A small number of research articles explore eﬀorts to ban sex selection abortion
in the USA. A general similarity with ‘‘pro woman, pro-life’’ claims is the perceived
need for a new way to frame abortion as a social problem (Kalantry, 2013).
However, distinct and speciﬁc features of this version of feminised opposition to
abortion have been identiﬁed. First, claims for bans on sex selection abortion dir-
ectly draw on feminist language, especially the term ‘‘gendercide’’. The origin of
this term is attributed to the feminist philosopher Mary Ann Warren (1985) who
used it to describe the deliberate mass killing of either males or females, and it was
subsequently popularised by economist Amartya Sen to describe abortion of
female foetuses and infanticide involving female babies in Asia (1990; see also
Purewal & Eklund, 2017). Second, they focus not only on the pregnant woman
but also the foetus as harmed by abortion (with the latter often described as a ‘‘girl
child’’). Third, they link the abortion problem to ethnicity.
Kalantry (2013) explains that Illinois was the ﬁrst state in the USA to ban sex
selection abortion as far back as 1985 and Pennsylvania introduced a ban in 1989.
Kalantry’s argument about these bans, however, is that the claims made for them
diﬀer from those made to support later bans, passed in seven further states in the
USA by 2013. In the 1980s, there was no linkage made to practices in other coun-
tries, but claims supporting more recent bans make such links explicit. In 2011 the
state of Arizona, for example, passed the ‘‘Susan B. Anthony and Frederick
Douglass Prenatal Non-discrimination Act’’, which makes it a felony for doc-
tors to knowingly perform abortion for race or sex selective reasons. As Musial
explains:
The ﬁrst of its kind in the United States, HB 2443 (2011) turns abortion into a non-
discrimination issue; it is now a class 3 felony to knowingly provide abortion services
on the basis of the race or sex of the ‘child’ or the race or sex of the ‘child’s’ parent; it
is also a crime to coerce, threaten or intimidate a woman into accepting an abortion
on the basis of fetal race or sex; and anyone who ‘solicits or accepts monies to ﬁnance
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a sex-selection or race-selection abortion’ is committing a crime. If convicted an abor-
tion provider who knowingly conducts race or sex-selection abortions may face three
and a half years in prison . . .. Women seeking an abortion cannot be charged with a
crime under HB 2443. (Musial, 2014, p. 263)
This assessment draws attention to the framing of an abortion ban as an act of
‘‘non-discrimination’’, to the construction of both ‘‘the child’’ and the pregnant
woman as victims of crime, and to the potential for imprisonment of doctors.
Musial also notes the explicit linking to ‘‘gendercide’’ as an ‘‘imported problem’’:
During the discussion about sex-selection, gendercide in China and India was depicted
as a real problem ‘over there’ in the East that the American Government . . . should
aim to prevent ‘over here’ in the West. (Musial, 2014, p. 269)
Reference, explains Musial, was made to Amartya Sen’s claim about ‘‘gendercide’’
and 100 million ‘‘missing girls’’ in Asia, and sex selection abortion was also com-
pared to ‘‘honour killings’’. There was deployment of ‘‘feminist language’’, she
argues, when the Bill’s proponents said that ‘‘sex-selection and ‘honour killings’
are global manifestations of violence against women’’, and that this language
created, ‘‘an us v. them paradigm where anyone who prefers sons or contemplates
sex selection abortion is constructed as foreign or violent’’ (Musial, 2014, p. 270).
Work on woman-centred anti-abortion claims has detailed their ‘‘diﬀusion’’ from
the US to Britain (Lee, 2004) and it is arguable, as we go on to detail, that the
framing of the problem of sex selection abortion, as outlined by Kalantry (2013)
and Musial (2014), has spread in a similar way.
Our assessment of what happened in Britain is based on a qualitative analysis of
the British print media, speciﬁcally national newspapers, between 23 February 2012
and 31 March 2015. Articles were retrieved through a LexisNexis search using the
terms ‘‘sex selection’’, ‘‘abortion’’, ‘‘Gendercide’’ and ‘‘Fiona Bruce’’. A total of 66
articles comprised the ﬁnal dataset, but with uneven occurrence in diﬀerent news-
papers. While most national newspapers covered the story at some point, there was
most coverage in The Telegraph; journalists working for this newspaper were key
claimsmakers. However, The Independent, a newspaper considered, in contrast to
The Telegraph, to be pro-choice editorially, also published more articles than other
papers and made claims that shaped events through 2014 and 2015.
A second set of documents published in response to claims made by journalists
was also analysed. The then Secretary of State for Health Andrew Lansley
responded immediately to claims made by The Telegraph in 2012 by initiating
investigations into the practices of abortion providers. These were carried out by
the Care Quality Commission (CQC) (the body responsible for regulating facilities
providing health and social care services in England). Following a police investi-
gation, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) (the body responsible for bringing
prosecutions of criminal cases investigated by the police in England and Wales)
also conducted an inquiry, and both the CQC and CPS published reports.
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The Department of Health (DoH) published two statistical analyses of birth data
and a policy statement. Parliamentary debates were held in November 2014
and February 2015. (Full details of the media coverage discussed below, and
of all other documents analysed, can be found in Appendix 1, available online at
journals.sagepub.com/home/fap).
The analysis followed Best’s (2008) argument that eﬀorts to persuade normally
include three component parts: grounds (evidence, statistics and information which
typify the social problem); warrants (appeals to value sets to indicate why some-
thing should be done); and conclusions (recommendations for changes, for example,
new laws or policies). We made grounds, ‘‘statements describing the condition
[which] argue that the condition exists, and oﬀer supporting evidence’’ (Best,
2008, p. 31), the central focus, to consider how those seeking to construct sex
selection abortion as a problem typiﬁed it. Our discussion broadly follows the
way claimsmaking developed chronologically, and our analysis indicates that
there were three sorts of grounds for claims, as we now detail.
Sex selection abortion as a British social problem
Abortion doctors as villains
The ‘‘sex selection abortion story’’ broke in February 2012 when The Telegraph
published six articles, accompanied by on-line AV footage, based on undercover
ﬁlming at three abortion clinics in Manchester, Birmingham and London. Nine
clinics in all had been visited, and according to the journalists involved, they had
ﬁlmed undercover at the clinics because:
The prevalence of sex selection abortions is hard to prove – as discussion between
patients and doctors within a consulting room is necessarily sacrosanct. Therefore,
this newspaper decided to take the step of accompanying happily pregnant women
posing as people seeking abortions, to a limited number of private clinics. (Watt,
Newall, & Zhimji, 2012)
Best (2008) notes there are three components to grounds that might be apparent
when a claim about a social problem is ﬁrst made. There may be: typifying exam-
ples (examples which are in fact rarely typical, but which dramatise and disturb, to
illustrate the seriousness of a problem); the naming of a problem (often as an
example of an already accepted problem); and statistics (which show that the prob-
lem is very widespread and also measured to be so). As we will go on to discuss, all
these were features of claimsmaking as events unfolded. Claimsmaking at the
outset, however, as the extract from The Telegraph above suggests, was focussed
away from claims about numbers; indeed the case made was that ‘‘the prevalence of
sex selection abortion is hard to prove’’. The naming of the problem at this point
was ambiguous; the terms ‘‘sex selection abortion’’, ‘‘gender abortion’’ but also
‘‘abortion on demand’’ were used, and there was no use of the term ‘‘gendercide’’ in
the original reporting.
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The ground identiﬁed was, rather, a typifying example which sought to disturb,
but more speciﬁcally this initial ground is perhaps best thought of as a type Best
describes as ‘‘additional’’, which ‘‘identiﬁes categories of people involved in the
troubling condition’’ (2008, p. 35). Following Loeseke (2003), Best suggests these
categories often represent people as ‘‘victims’’ and ‘‘villains’’, and for the problem
of sex selection abortion in Britain, it was the latter that most clearly formed the
original ground for the claim, with doctors as the villains.
The opening lines of the ﬁrst Telegraph report read as follows:
With its pale leather sofas and brightly-lit reception, the sleek oﬃce could have been
just another call centre or accountancy ﬁrm in central Manchester. But for one visitor
earlier this month, the nature of its business could not have been more serious. Despite
its appearance this was an abortion clinic at Pall Mall Medical and it was a matter of
life and death. (Watt, Newall, & Zhimji, 2012)
This description of the ambience of one clinic and of abortion provision as a
‘‘business’’, like ‘‘call centres’’ and ‘‘accountancy’’, represents the motivation of
doctors as at odds with the to-be-expected ethical orientation of medicine. Extracts
used from transcripts in the reporting are designed, in part, to highlight this point.
The doctor at this clinic, a Dr Sivaraman, is reported to have said, ‘‘I don’t ask
questions. If you want a termination, you want a termination’’ (Newell & Watt,
2012). This comment could be interpreted as a commitment to respect women’s
autonomy, but here is presented to reinforce a lack of care for patients borne out of
a desire to make money.
Another way doctors were villainised was through their representation as sup-
porters of discrimination. Much was made in reporting of a comment attributed to
a Dr Rajmohan (named throughout by Telegraph journalists as Dr Raj Mohan)
that sex selection abortion is ‘‘like female infanticide’’, and that, ‘‘It’s common in
the Third World to have female infanticide’’ (Watt, Newell, & Winnett, 2012). The
implication (especially given the emphasis on the Indian-sounding name of the
doctor) is that what is taking place is a version of ‘‘gendercide’’. However, this
claim was not developed in reporting at this point.
Rather, emphasis was placed strongly on the claim that evidence had been found
of law violation: ‘‘Sex selection terminations are illegal, but clinics show willingness
to carry them out’’ was the subtitle of one of the articles breaking the story (Watt,
Newall, & Zhimji, 2012) and it was this ground that was responded to by others,
and notably rapidly. The day after they broke the story, The Telegraph carried a
piece by the then Secretary of State for Health, Andrew Lansley, titled: ‘‘Health
professionals must not think they know better than the law’’. In it, Lansley argued:
Anyone indulging in illegal activity must understand they are running a great risk. The
potential penalty for breaking abortion legislation is imprisonment. Doctors could be
struck oﬀ. And we will not hesitate to pursue any evidence that comes into our hands.
Anyone who ﬂouts the law can be assured that they will end up feeling its full force.
(Lansley, 2012)
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The rapid linking of the ground of the doctor as villain to the conclusion that
doctors will end up feeling the ‘‘full force’’ of law is striking, and the measures
through which investigations of law breaking were to be pursued – investigations of
abortion clinics by the CQC, and investigations of the doctors ﬁlmed by
The Telegraph by the General Medical Council, and by the police, were announced
by Lansley at this very early stage (2012).
It was reporting about the ﬁndings of the CQC investigation that formed the
next focus for claims from March 2012, in fact four months before the CQC’s
report was made publicly available, and this claimsmaking continued when the
report was published in July 2012. At this point the commission published ‘‘249
individual inspection reports into providers oﬀering termination of pregnancy ser-
vices’’, with its summary of these inspections noting that inspections took place
over less than two weeks in March 2012, and stating the following: ‘‘As a result of
these unannounced inspections, CQC identiﬁed clear evidence of pre-signing at 14
locations, all of which were NHS Trusts’’ (CQC, 2012).
Under British law, an abortion can only be legally provided where two regis-
tered medical practitioners (doctors) agree ‘‘in good faith’’ that the terms of the
1967 Abortion Act have been met. Their agreement must be notiﬁed to the DoH,
and this takes place through submission of a form designated for this purpose,
which they have signed. There have been debates in recent years about procedures
sometimes used for signing these forms, termed ‘‘signing unseen’’ and ‘‘pre-
signing’’, and as the extract above indicates, the latter was discussed in the CQC
report. In the former case, forms are signed where a doctor has not seen the woman
concerned personally, but has discussed her case with other members of clinic staﬀ
such as nurses or counsellors. In ‘‘pre-signing’’, a discussion between a doctor and
other staﬀ members may take place, for example, by telephone, and a form that is
already signed is then used.
In these debates about the signing of forms, some, including some opposed to
abortion, have accused abortion providers of acting illegally, and oﬀering inadequate
levels of medical attention, where these practices are adopted. Providers have pointed
to the need to manage high case-loads of mainly early abortion procedures that rely
on care primarily from nursing and counselling staﬀ, not doctors, and hold that it is
not necessary for every woman to have a full consultation with a doctor.
In 2012, a controversy of this sort about ‘‘pre-signing’’ spun oﬀ following the
publication of a CQC report separate to that about sex selection. Claims were made
about the need to newly regulate abortion providers in relation to procedures used
to sign forms because of what the CQC had reported. The detail of this debate is
beyond the scope of this paper; however, what matters here is that the CQC report
made no mention of sex selection abortion at all, despite the fact that this was the
original focus for its investigation. Yet, despite the fact that the CQC had found no
evidence of sex selection abortion at any of the 249 clinics it inspected, links were,
nonetheless, made in media reporting back to The Telegraph’s allegations from
February (Watt & Newell, 2012). Comments attributed to Lansley indicated,
again, a focus on doctors as law violators: ‘‘[I]t is pretty much people engaging
in a culture of. . . ignoring the law. . . If there is evidence of an oﬀence we will give it
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directly to the police’’, he was reported to have stated (Winnett, Newell, & Watt,
2012).
The claims about doctors made between February and July 2012 attracted
almost no counterclaims. An editorial in The Independent claimed: ‘‘the evidence
that some British clinics are unashamedly agreeing to perform abortions on that
basis [sex selection] is deplorable’’ (Independent, 2012). Commentary from those
who describe themselves as feminist was especially noteworthy. Two articles
authored by feminists contained a riposte. The legal scholar Sally Sheldon (2012)
called into question a range of claims made about both the law and the practices of
abortion doctors, and journalist Sarah Ditum (2012) similarly made counterclaims,
disputing grounds. She also uniquely argued that the case for the right to choose
abortion has to include abortion for fetal sex. However, other feminist commen-
tators endorsed the villainisation of doctors and, although the problem was not
named this way by The Telegraph, their commentary also suggested ‘‘gendercide’’
was happening in Britain.
Feminist journalist and writer Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (2012), for example,
explicitly constructed doctors as money-grabbing, sexist and prepared to act illeg-
ally. An article she wrote was titled: ‘‘Greedy doctors and why I despair for British
Asian women who abort female foetuses’’. In February 2012 The Telegraph pub-
lished a long feature article by another high proﬁle feminist writer and newspaper
columnist, Allison Pearson. The opening lines read:
In the third world, unwanted baby girls ‘disappear’. It’s called gendercide. And it’s
happening in this country, too; those who act illegally to abort unwanted babies
because of their gender should feel the full force of the law. (Pearson, 2012)
The next point at which sex selection abortion was debated in the press was in
autumn 2013, and coverage responded to announcements by the CPS about
whether to prosecute the doctors ﬁlmed by The Telegraph. The CPS announced
its decision this way, in its report on the outcomes of its investigation:
The Crown Prosecution Service has decided that it would not be in the public interest
to prosecute two doctors in relation to alleged attempts to commit abortions on the
grounds of foetal gender. These decisions result from an investigation (Operation
Monto) carried out by several police forces and coordinated by the Metropolitan
Police Service, following an undercover operation by a newspaper. We have previ-
ously advised police that there is insuﬃcient evidence to prosecute four medical pro-
fessionals in relation to this matter. (CPS, 2013)
The news that there were to be no prosecutions of doctors formed the focus for
subsequent claimsmaking in 2013. Again, the villainy of abortion doctors was
central to the claims made by The Telegraph, with the CPS presented as a collab-
orator in this villainy (Bingham & Newell, 2013), and again feminist commentary
endorsed the ground of law-violating doctors. Cathy Newman, the presenter of
Channel 4 News, in an article titled ‘‘The selective abortion of girls is a crime.
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Simple as. So why no criminal charges?’’, claimed: ‘‘Although it’s primarily a prob-
lem in parts of India and China, there’s growing evidence it’s also carried out
illegally in communities in this country’’ (Newman, 2013).
Coverage also highlighted comments attacking the CPS, including those from
Emily Thornberry, a senior Labour Party MP, known to be a feminist, but who
condemned the decision as a ‘‘disgraceful’’ expression of sexism (Cohen, 2013;
Watt & Wyatt, 2013). The Guardian carried a comment arguing: ‘‘We must be
prepared to circumscribe our pro-choice position. . . A girl’s right to life has to
be a basic tenet of any feminist position’’ (Gupta, 2013). Only The Times reported
in a diﬀerent way, carrying a lengthy interview with Ann Furedi, the Chief
Executive of the abortion provider British Pregnancy Advisory Service, in which
she commented: ‘‘Sex selection is not a problem in Britain today. It simply isn’t
happening. If people are going to claim that sex selection abortion is a big issue
within certain Asian communities, it is at least imperative for them to demonstrate
it is actually happening’’ (Bannerman, 2013).
Statistics as grounds
As noted previously, the ﬁrst articles in The Telegraph justiﬁed undercover ﬁlming
on the basis that evidence is hard to come by. Insofar as numbers were mentioned, it
was through reference to a research paper by two Oxford academics, Sylvie Dubuc
and David Coleman (Watt, Newall, & Zhimji, 2012). Dubuc and Coleman’s study
(2007) had been a reference point for claims about sex selection prior to 2012 (BBC
News Online, 2007; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 2011; UNICEF,
2014). Those leading eﬀorts from 2012 to bring the problem of sex selection to
others’ attention, however, suggested that on its own, this evidence was not
enough; as The Telegraph put it, the research found only ‘‘indirect’’ evidence,
among ‘‘a small minority of Indian born women in England and Wales’’ (Watt,
Newall, & Zhimji, 2012). Numbers did become the focus for grounds, however, with
claimsmakers taking issue with oﬃcial statistics produced by the DoH. This time, it
was not The Telegraph that pressed claims, but rather The Independent.
The DoH for England and Wales published two reports about ‘‘gender ratios at
birth’’, in May 2013 and May 2104. These were compiled in response to a mandate
from the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2011) that all member states
of the European Union must ‘‘collect the ratio at birth [proportion of males to
females in the population usually expressed as the number of males per 100 females
with a skewed norm of 105 male births to 100 females], monitor its development
and take prompt action to tackle imbalances’’ and ‘‘encourage research on sex
ratios at birth among speciﬁc communities’’. The 2013 report’s ‘‘Key Results’’,
based on analysis of births 2007–11, were that:
The UK gender ratio is 105.1 male births to 100 female and is well within the normal
boundaries for populations. When broken down by mothers’ country of birth, no
group is statistically diﬀerent from the range that we would expect to see naturally
occurring.
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Upon its publication, this report did not become a source of any claimsmaking in
the media at all. However, in January 2014, The Independent published a series of
articles. One was titled ‘‘The lost girls’’ and its opening lines read, ‘‘Prenatal sex
selection has reduced female population by between 1,400 and 4,700, say aca-
demics’’ (Connor, 2014a) and claimed that ‘‘oﬃcial assurances’’ about the absence
of evidence for sex selection abortion in Britain should not be accepted. This
reporting linked claims about the untrustworthiness of ‘‘oﬃcial assurances’’
based on DoH statistics to ‘‘gendercide’’. ‘‘It seems that global war on girls has
arrived in Britain’’ began one article (Connor, 2014b), with reporting including
comment from Amartya Sen: ‘‘Selective abortion of female foetuses – what can be
called ‘natality discrimination’ – is a kind of hi-tech manifestation of a preference
of boys’’.
The other feature of grounds introduced by The Independent was the use of
typifying examples of abortion’s alleged victims, preﬁguring themes in subsequent
parliamentary debate. One article began:
Rupi remembers her second pregnancy with terrible despair. Having given birth to a
girl two years before, she had expected the further love and support of her husband
and his family. Instead, she came under extraordinary pressure to have an abortion.
This article carried comment from Jasvinder Sangera, ‘‘a campaigner on forced
marriages and ‘honour violence’ against women’’, who stated: ‘‘There is absolutely
no doubt that these terminations, where a mother has an abortion because the child
is a girl, are taking place within the South Asian population in Britain’’ (Milmo,
2014). A further article, published in January 2014, carried a comment from ‘‘Rani
Bikhu, of the Slough-based woman’s charity Jenna International’’, who named the
problem ‘‘womb terrorism’’, claimed the Government sought to ‘‘appease commu-
nities’’ and that this was ‘‘an issue of violence against women before they are born’’
(Connor & Milmo, 2014).
May 2014 saw the publication of a second report about birth ratios by the DoH.
This report noted that claims had been made in the media, and this time, the ‘‘Key
Results’’ set out were as follows:
The analysis by country of birth and ethnicity do not oﬀer evidence of sex selection
taking place within England and Wales. Without exception, the wide variation in birth
ratios was within the bounds expected as a result of genetics, socio-economic diﬀerences
and random variation. In both the analysis by country of birth and the analysis by
ethnicity, no group was associated with a boy to girl ratio higher than the expected
upper limit of 107. That was the case for both the overall birth ratio and by birth order.
This ﬁrm refutation of numbers as a ground meant that numbers were rendered
insuﬃcient for claims about the prevalence of sex selection abortion to develop
further. However, typiﬁcation of the problem through use of personal stories,
explicitly linking abortion to the ethnicity and to violence against women, emerged
as central to the last phase of the public debate.
Lee 25
Personal testimony as typification
By mid-way through 2014, strong claims had been pressed about law-violating
doctors, but the CQC found no evidence of such, the CPS had rejected the claim
that there was evidence suﬃcient to suggest doctors had broken the law, and stat-
isticians had reiterated birth ratios for all ethnic groups were as expected. There
was no further media coverage until November 2014, when the location for claims-
making shifted to Parliament.
‘‘MPs poised to declare gender abortion illegal’’ stated a headline in The
Telegraph on 2 November (Bingham, 2014), and two days later the paper claimed:
‘‘MPs have voted overwhelmingly in favour of a motion declaring that sex selection
abortion is illegal’’ (Graham, 2014). This reporting concerned a debate and vote in
Parliament on a 10 Minute Rule Bill in November proposed by Fiona Bruce MP,
that asked: ‘‘That leave be given to bring in a Bill to clarify the law relating to
abortion on the basis of sex-selection; and for connected purposes’’. Votes on such
bills do not change law, but are taken as an indication about whether further
debate should take place, and MPs did vote ‘‘overwhelmingly’’ for this to
happen; the vote was 181 in favour, one against (Hansard, 2015).
In introducing her 10 Minute Rule Bill, Bruce began: ‘‘[W]e know that sex
selective abortions are happening in the UK and little is being done to stop
them. We know that because a growing number of courageous women are speaking
out about their experiences’’. Argued Bruce:
Despite the existence of such stories, there are still those who claim that there is no
evidence for the practice. In response to these critics, Rani Bilku, the director of Jeena
International, said: ‘Saying there is no evidence is tantamount to saying these women
are lying and that our organisation is making things up’.
Personal testimony typifying the problem, of the sort previously highlighted in
reporting in The Independent, thus now became the central ground, and opposition
was constructed between this ground and statistics. The almost unanimous support
for Bruce’s 10 Minute Rule Bill suggests MPs were, at this point, persuaded by
this claim.
In the end, Bruce pursued her eﬀort to change the law in a diﬀerent way,
through her proposed amendment to the Serious Crime Bill, and at the outset
support for her continued. Reporting in January 2015 stated: ‘‘More than 70 mem-
bers, spanning the main parties’’ had put their names on Bruce’s amendment to the
Serious Crimes Bill, and quoted Bruce, as Chair of the All Party Pro Life Group,
and also Mary Ann Glindon, a Labour Party MP: ‘‘If opposing the abortion of
baby girls – often under coercion – makes me anti-choice then I will wear the label
with pride’’, she said. The ﬁrst reference in the media also appeared at this point to
a new campaign, called ‘‘stopgendercide.org’’ (Bingham, 2015). A few days later,
an article by Bruce herself discussed ‘‘the new campaigning website, ‘Stop
Gendercide’’’, compared sex selection abortion to Female Genital Mutilation
(FGM) and forced marriage, and claimed an oﬃcial statement about numbers
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‘‘is not the last word on the issue . . . because Government statistics do not reﬂect
the reality’’ (Bruce, 2015).
It was grounds of this type that continued to characterize her case. In her
speeches in the debate on the Serious Crime Bill, Bruce thus stated the suggestion
that ‘‘there is no evidence for sex selective abortion’’ was ‘‘quite oﬀensive’’, and
argued: ‘‘Yes, the numbers are small compared with those in China or India but
they are real. Should we have to wait for those numbers to grow before we take
action?’’ However, as we noted at the start of this article, the Bruce amendment was
defeated in the vote in Parliament. We now turn, in our ﬁnal account of grounds, to
discuss the terms on which her claims were refuted.
As we noted already, through 2012 and 2013 very few spoke out against those
claiming that sex selection abortion was a social problem in Britain, and our
searches identiﬁed only one newspaper article written in response to Bruce’s 10
Minute Rule Bill critical of it (Eddo-Lodge, 2014). However, in the immediate run-
up to the debate on the Serious Crime Bill in 2015, matters began to shift. For
example, in response to the publication of Bruce’s proposed amendment to the bill,
‘‘medical professionals and academics’’ (The Telegraph, Letters, 2015) and ‘‘aca-
demics and groups representing black and Asian women’’ (The Independent,
Letters, 2015) wrote to the press arguing against what Bruce sought to do. An
editorial in The Observer published the day before the debate argued the amend-
ment should not be supported (The Observer, 2015).
The day before the debate in Parliament, reporting seemed to indicate that,
without doubt, Bruce’s proposal to include a new clause in the bill to speciﬁcally
prohibit sex selection abortion was to face a rocky ride. Inﬂuenced by campaign-
ing from pro-choice groups and other organisations (e.g. Voice for Choice,
2015), some MPs had by this point organised to oppose Bruce’s eﬀorts.
‘‘Labour torpedoes attempt to outlaw same sex [sic] abortions’’, reported The
Telegraph, highlighting that a letter from a senior Labour Party MP, Yvette
Cooper, which had been circulated to MPs in her party, objecting that the
Bruce amendment could have ‘‘troubling consequences’’ (Swinford, 2015). On
the day of the debate itself, commentary was published against Bruce’s proposal
in newspapers including The Telegraph (Kent, 2015; Gordon, 2015; Sanghani,
2015a). This media coverage indicated that pro-choice organisations and some
medical organisations had, by now, worked to raise convincing objections to the
Bruce amendment.
These counterclaims were reﬂected in debate in Parliament, with a group of MPs
speaking to oppose the Bruce amendment. The shift, however, was not in relation
to the warrant; no one made a case in Parliament that sex selection abortion, where
chosen, could ever be tolerated morally. When it came to grounds, no overt coun-
terclaims were made either, disputing the veracity of The Telegraph’s undercover
ﬁlms. (Rather, assurances were given that all doctors and abortion providers had
been given new guidance emphasising their legal obligations.) Neither was it argued
generally that statistical evidence meant claims about sex selection abortion being a
problem should be rejected. Rather, as the then Minister for Health Jane Ellison
put it, ‘‘the Government will remain vigilant, will continue to monitor data and will
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be fully open to any other evidence that comes to light’’. Only one MP, Fiona
Mactaggart, took issue with the veracity of ‘‘other evidence’’ as it pertained so far,
namely personal testimony:
[S]he [Fiona Bruce] quoted extensively from an organisation based in my constituency,
but personal experience of how that organisation has failed to help individual con-
stituents has led me to the conclusion that it is not possible to depend on the accuracy
of what it says. I am therefore concerned that we are using anecdotes from an unre-
liable source to make legislation on the hoof.
Counterclaims rested, rather, on problematic consequences of the amendment and
its wording. Three main consequences were raised. These were, ﬁrst, that justiﬁable
sex selection abortion – that associated with genetic disorder – would be inadvert-
ently outlawed (Kate Green MP and Glenda Jackson MP). Second, it was argued
that women whom Stop Gendercide purported to help would in fact end up being
harmed. Ann Coﬀey MP, for example, argued, that ‘‘[W]omen subject to intoler-
able pressure to abort will continue to be subject to coercion’’ and ‘‘that might lead
them to pursue alternative routes. . . We do not want to go back to the days of
botched backstreet abortions’’. Third the claim was pressed that, if passed, the
Bruce amendment would potentially undermine the basis for all abortion by
including the term ‘‘unborn child’’ in the law (Lucian Berger MP, Dr Sarah
Wollaston MP).
Almost 300 MPs were, in the end, persuaded to vote against Bruce’s proposal,
and reporting following the vote made it clear she and her supporters perceived this
as a very heavy defeat for their eﬀorts (Sanghani, 2015b). However, the Bruce
amendment was not simply voted down. It was defeated because MPs were able
to vote for an alternative amendment, committing the Government to address
‘‘prejudices, customs, traditions’’ which ‘‘amount to pressure to seek a termination
on the grounds of the sex of the foetus.’’ This amendment was passed almost
unanimously and ensured that Bruce’s eﬀorts failed. MPs did not, therefore, opt
to reject the claim that sex selection abortion is a British social problem outright,
but rather voted to address it as a serious crime in a diﬀerent way to that proposed
by Bruce.
Conclusions: A social problem in search of grounds
From a social constructionist perspective, sex selection abortion in Britain can be
considered a social problem in search of grounds. No ground about which claims
were made ultimately persuaded enough others to agree with conclusions proposed
to prosecute doctors for law violation, or to amend the law to speciﬁcally prohibit
sex selection abortion. However, counterclaims were made only at ‘‘the 11th hour’’,
in the days before the debate on the Serious Crime Bill. This meant that it was
possible for new grounds to emerge and reignite the debate over the three years
2012–15. It also meant that the end result was not a clear rejection of the claim that
sex selection abortion is a social problem in Britain, but rather the
28 Feminism & Psychology 27(1)
institutionalisation of the claim in what became Section 84 of the Serious Crime Act.
The amendment that was passed and that became Section 84 allowed MPs to make
it clear that they abhor the idea of sex selection abortion without changing the
terms of the abortion law itself. The subsequent outcome of Section 84 is interest-
ing in this regard. As noted above, this committed the Government to assess evi-
dence of ‘‘termination of pregnancy on the grounds of the sex of the foetus’’, and in
August 2015 the DoH published its ﬁndings. This, on the one hand, very strongly
reiterated the outcomes of assessments of birth ratio data discussed in this paper,
speciﬁcally that there is no evidence that sex selection abortion was taking place.
On the other, however, it oﬀered support for research and other activities that
might be pursued by those claiming sex selection abortion occurs in Britain, thus
making clear oﬃcial abhorrence of the practice (DoH, 2015).
We have suggested the contribution of some feminist commentators to this
outcome was signiﬁcant. Public feminism, in the form of commentary in the
media and in the political sphere, allied itself most strongly with claims that ‘‘some-
thing must be done’’ about sex selection abortion. This meant, ﬁrst, that for the
ﬁrst time in Britain, those who oppose abortion gained a signiﬁcant degree of
endorsement of their feminised claims. Second, it highlighted that some feminists
were also prepared to racialize the abortion problem. As we noted previously, one
aspect to claims made about sex selection abortion in the USA has been about
‘‘Asian problems’’ taking root ‘‘over here’’ (Musial, 2014), and part of the feminist
contribution to the British debate was to make claims along these lines. Some high-
proﬁle feminists saw the furore surrounding The Telegraph’s undercover operation
as an opportunity to link abortion in Britain to ‘‘gendercide’’. They opted to make
claims that what happens in Britain is a version of this well-established social
problem, and to condemn it in the strongest possible terms.
While the abortion law on paper remained unchanged at the end of this abortion
debate, this does not mean that what happened can be considered without conse-
quence. We end with comment on two aspects of law in practice – how abortion is
actually provided to women – which we suggest should be matters for research and
attention by those concerned with women’s ability to access abortion services. The
ﬁrst is the provision of abortion to women of Asian heritage. The claim that such
women presenting for abortion may be doing so because they are victims of male
pressure or violence emanating from ‘‘their culture’’ attained a new degree of
attention during the debate discussed here. Opponents of the Bruce Amendment
raised concerns about possible consequences of this claim. They pointed to the
prospect of abortion providers feeling pressure to enact ‘‘racial proﬁling’’ and,
for example, question women of Asian heritage in a diﬀerent or more detailed
way about their request to terminate a pregnancy (Voice for Choice, 2015). This
draws attention to the way campaigns against sex selection abortion can potentially
lead to diﬀerential treatment of women that undermines the autonomy of some, in
the name of ‘‘rights for women and girls’’.
The second aspect of the law in practice is the destabilisation of longstanding
presumptions about medical authority and judgement as part of the provision of
abortion in Britain. The underlying context for the episode of debate discussed here
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is the abortion law. Under British law, abortion is criminalised by the 1861 Oﬀences
Against the Person Act (OAPA). Section 58 of this act makes it an oﬀence punish-
able by imprisonment for a woman to attempt to ‘‘procure her own miscarriage’’
and ‘‘administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing, or. . . unlawfully use
any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent’’. It also makes it an
oﬀence for anyone else to ‘‘unlawfully administer to her or cause to be taken by her
any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other
means whatsoever with the like intent’’. This archaic criminalisation of both women
and doctors is, however, modiﬁed by the 1967 Abortion Act. Under this act, abor-
tion can be legally provided to women as long as two doctors agree ‘‘in good faith’’
that the terms of the act have been met. It was these terms, under which a woman
can be legally provided abortion, which the Bruce amendment sought to modify, by
speciﬁcally stating that the sex of the foetus is not one of them.
This abortion law, as feminist scholars have emphasised, gives British women no
right to abortion at any stage in pregnancy (Boyle, 1997; Sheldon, 1997). Rather,
through its Section 1, it allows ‘‘registered medical practitioners’’ to legally provide
abortion on the basis of their ‘‘good faith’’ assessments of the woman’s health and
circumstances. The terms on which doctors can make these assessments are very
broad; they do not rule in or out any reason a woman might herself have for an
abortion but, rather, they ‘‘medicalise’’ the basis for legal abortion as a matter
requiring doctors’ insight about the eﬀect of a pregnancy for a woman and her
existing family (see also McCulloch and Weatherall, 2017, for discussion of a legal
arrangement in New Zealand with some similar features).
Literature on the subject has generally characterised the doctor as being made
powerful by this law. The main focus of commentary from a feminist perspective
has been that women are, as a result, detrimentally aﬀected because women are
denied the right to make a choice about their pregnancies (decision-making instead
rests ultimately with doctors) and may be denied access to abortion. One overriding
feature of the debate discussed here, in stark contrast, was that some abortion
doctors speciﬁcally, and abortion providers in general, were claimed on ‘‘fem-
inised’’ grounds to have acted to the detriment of women not by denying women
abortion, but by providing it too easily. It was on this basis that doctors’ ‘‘inter-
pretation’’ of the law became the subject of forceful criticism and politicians and
doctors were, on this basis, investigated under threat of criminal prosecution and
potential prison sentence.
This representation of women and doctors as in opposition, with the former as
victims of cultural norms with which doctors may collaborate unless prevented
from doing so by the criminal law, emerges overall as the most distinctive feature
of the construction of sex selection abortion as a social problem in Britain. The
‘‘villainisation’’ of doctors and abortion providers is a familiar aspect of claims-
making about abortion in the USA (Lee, 2004) and has some precedents in debates
in Britain through claims that uncaring abortion providers fail to counsel women
suﬃciently (Hoggart, 2015). However, during the events discussed in this paper
doctors were threatened with prosecution and investigated by the most powerful
criminal law agency in Britain with almost no counterclaims made in their defence,
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including by those who call themselves feminists. Those who research and comment
about abortion now need to ﬁnd ways to highlight and explore this development in
the social construction of abortion.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the following for their insights and also comments on drafts of this
article: Jennie Bristow, Sally Sheldon, Kate Greasley, Carole Sanger, Lesley Hoggart, Navtej
Purewal, Pam Lowe and Ann Furedi. Thanks especially to Kate Greasley and Carole Sanger
for giving me the opportunity to discuss the issues at a Law School Seminar at the University
of Oxford in 2015.
Author’s note
This article reﬂects ongoing discussion with colleagues and was written alongside the scholarly
work of others also writing about the events discussed here; although I am the sole author and
the work is mine, it is for this reason that I use the word ‘‘we’’ throughout the text.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conﬂicts of interest with respect to the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no ﬁnancial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication
of this article.
References
BBC News Online. (2007). UK Indian woman ‘aborting girls’, 3 December. Retrieved from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7123753.stm.
Best, J. (2008). Social problems. New York, NY: WW. Norton and Company.
Boyle, M. (1997). Rethinking abortion, Psychology, gender, power and the law. London: Routledge.
Cannold, L. (2002). Understanding and responding to anti-choice women-centred strategies.
Reproductive Health Matters, 10(19), 171–179.
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. (2011). Prenatal sex selection. Retrieved
from http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTMLEN.asp?fileid¼18020&
lang¼en.
Department of Health. (2015). Abortion on grounds of sex of the foetus. Retrieved from
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/abortion-on-grounds-of-sex-of-the-foetus.
Dubuc, S., & Coleman, D. (2007). An increase in the sex ratio of births to India-born
mothers in England and Wales: Evidence for sex-selective abortion. Population and
Development Review, 33(2), 383–400.
Gavey, N., & Gow, V. (2001). ‘Cry wolf’, cried the world: Constructing the issue of false
rape allegations in New Zealand media texts. Feminism and Psychology, 11(3), 341–360.
Greasley, K. (2014). The pearl of the ‘Pro-Life’ movement? Reflections on the Kermit
Gosnell controversy. Journal of Medical Ethics, 40(6), 419–423.
Hansard (Daily Hansard). (2015). Serious Crime Bill debate, 23 February (starting Column
113). Retrieved from http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/
cm150223/detext/150223-0003.htm.
Lee 31
Hoggart, L. (2015). Abortion counselling in Britain: Understanding the controversy.
Sociology Compass, 9(5), 365–378.
Kalantry, S. (2013). Sex selection in the United States and India: A contextualist feminist
approach. UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, 61, 61–85.
Kelly, K. (2014). The spread of ‘Post Abortion Syndrome’ as social diagnosis. Social Science
and Medicine, 102, 18–25.
Lee, E. (2004). Abortion, motherhood and mental health: The medicalization of reproduction in
the United States and Great Britain. New York, NY: Transaction Publishers.
Loeseke, D. (2003). Thinking about social problems. New York, NY: Aldine.
McCulloch, A., & Weatherall, A. (2017). The fragility of de facto abortion on demand in
New Zealand Aotearoa. Feminism & Psychology, 27(1), 92–100.
Musial, J. (2014). Fetal citizenship in the borderlands: Arizona’s house bill 2443 and state
logics of racism and orientalism. Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation
and Culture, 20(4–5), 262–278.
Purewal, N., & Eklund, L. (2017). The bio-politics of population control and sex selective
abortion in China and India. Feminism & Psychology, 27(1), 34–55.
Rose, M. (2011). Pro-life, pro-woman? Frame extension in the American antiabortion move-
ment. Journal of Women, Politics and Policy, 32(1), 1–27.
Saurette, P., & Gordon, K. (2013). Arguing abortion: The new anti-abortion discourse in
Canada. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 46(1), 157–185.
Savell, K. (2008). Life and death before birth: 4D ultrasound and the shifting frontiers of the
abortion debate. Legal Studies Research Paper University of Sydney No.08/89. Retrieved
from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼1219085.
Sen, A. (1990). More than 100 million women are missing. New York Review of Books, 37, 20
(20 December). Retrieved from http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1990/12/20/more-than-
100-million-womenare-missing/.
Serious Crime Act. (2015). Part 6, Section 84 (Termination of pregnancy on grounds of sex
of foetus). Retrieved from http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/9/section/84/
enacted.
Sheldon, S. (1997).Beyond control:Medical power and abortion law. London, UK: Pluto Press.
Siegal, R. B. (2007). The new politics of abortion: An equality analysis of woman protective
abortion restrictions. Yale Law School Public Law Working Paper No. 119. Retrieved
from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼958254.
Trumpy, A. J. (2014). Woman vs fetus: Frame transformation and intramovement dynamics
in the Pro Life movement. Sociological Spectrum: Mid-South Sociological Association,
34(2), 163–184.
UNICEF. (2014). Synthesis of research on gender biased sex selection insights and learnings
2001–2012. Retrieved from http://countryoffice.unfpa.org/india/drive/
UNICEFUNFPAGenderBiasedSexelection_26thsepfinal.pdf.
Voice for Choice. (2015). Briefings on sex selective abortion amendment. Retrieved from
http://vfc.org.uk/briefings-sex-selective-abortion-amendment/.
Warren, M. A. (1985). Gendercide: The implications of sex selection. London, UK: Rowman
and Littlefield.
Author Biography
Ellie Lee is Reader in Social Policy at the University of Kent. Her work explores
why everyday issues – for example how women feel after abortion, what they eat,
32 Feminism & Psychology 27(1)
drink and feel when pregnant, or how mothers feed their babies – turn into major
preoccupations for policy makers and become heated topics of wider public debate.
She is the author of Abortion, Motherhood and Mental Health: Medicalizing
Reproduction in the United States and Great Britain (Transaction, 2004) and co-
author of Parenting Culture Studies (Palgrave, 2015). She is the Director of the
Centre for Parenting Culture Studies (https://blogs.kent.ac.uk/parentingculturestu
dies/) and regularly discusses her research in the media and other public forums.
Lee 33
